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Routines, Organizational Change and Organizational Reliability:  
A Hidden Source of Variation 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Organizational routines have been perceived as stable targets of selection forces. This traditional 
assumption of the stability of routines, however, has been challenged by recent research pointing to 
the variability of routines. Drawing on a nuanced understanding of organizational routines, this study 
examines how such duality of routines influences organizational change. Using a simple theoretical 
model, we show that routine-level inertia, in conjunction with bounded rationality in planning changes, 
engenders a potential of exploration which fosters organizational adaptation. Consequently, the dual 
properties of routines help enhance organizational reliability and long-run performance in task 
environments characterized by complexity and myopic selection. We discuss how this advanced 
understanding of the role of routines helps elaborate the theory of economic evolution. 
 
Keywords: Organizational Routines, Organizational Inertia, Organizational Change, Organizational 
Reliability, Bounded Rationality, Evolutionary Theory 
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INTRODUCTION 
Do routines hinder or help organizational change? This is an important question to better 
understand the process of economic evolution because routines are related to both organizational 
adaptation and environmental selection. Routines retain previous solutions and enable continuous and 
reliable performance of organizational activities (Holland, 1975; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Besides 
reliability, such continuity or reproducibility also, however, generates strong inertial forces and 
resistance to change, which gives rise to the importance of selection as a powerful force of change 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Organizations do, however, adapt over time. Research suggests that 
routines can be amongst the central mechanisms that facilitate organizational change (e.g., Adler, 
Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999; Amburgey, Kelly, & Barnett, 1993; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Feldman, 
2000; Levitt & March, 1988). In this study, we suggest an overlooked, but prevalent, mechanism by 
which the inertial nature of routines helps, rather than hinders, organizational adaptation. Our theory 
helps understand the performance of high-reliability organizations that look inertial but keep surviving 
and often outperforming.  
Being counter-intuitive, the stream of research on the role of routines in facilitating 
organizational change has received enormous attention. Several mechanisms have been documented. 
First, stable and standardized routines provide reliable building blocks for new, innovative 
combinations which facilitate organizational change (Amburgey et al., 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Galunic & Rodan, 1998). Second, there are routines for change which govern the process through 
which organizations search for solutions to new problems, such as procedures for decision making 
and innovation (Adler et al., 1999; Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizations 
often partition roles and structures dedicated for operations and change, respectively (Adler et al., 
1999; Bigley & Roberts, 2001; e.g., Tushman & O’Reilly III, 1996). Third, recent research on the 
nature of routines suggests that a routine itself has the potential to introduce variations over time, 
which serves as a source of organizational change (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Pentland & Rueter, 
1994).  
Though intuitively appealing, it is important to note that these mechanisms facilitating 
organizational change all require some cognitive resources. This is significant because agents’ 
cognitive resources are widely considered to be limited (Simon, 1955). Given such bounds to agents’ 
cognitive resources, what impact do they have on whether routines help or hinder organizational 
change? Under conditions of bounded rationality, because change efforts do not always lead to 
improvement, allocating resources to facilitating change and to maintaining the potential of 
exploration can trade off organizational change with operational reliability or short-term efficiency. 
Therefore, better cognitive abilities or more resources dedicated to facilitating organizational change 
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do not necessarily lead to superior performance (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006), raising the question what 
impact bounds on the cognitive resources of agents have on the process and consequence of 
organizational change supported by the (routine-related) mechanisms.  
To pursue this question, we focus on two strong empirical regularities, the inertial nature of 
routines and the bounded rationality of decision makers, and draw attention to the complementarity 
between them. The impact of this complementarity on organizational change has not yet been fully 
integrated into the debate. Using a simple theoretical model, we show that routine-level inertia, in 
conjunction with bounded rationality in planning changes, engenders the potential of exploration 
which pushes forward organizational adaptation.  
A strong empirical regularity in many different fields of human behavior is that agents who 
follow habits and organizational routines resist changing their behavior (e.g., Marteau et al., 2012). 
This is the case not merely as long as such behavior leads to satisfactory results (March and Simon 
1958; Cyert and March 1963), but also in the face of negative performance feedback (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984). Such resistance to change at the routine level delays the implementation of planned 
changes (a more general feature of human behavior, Marteau et al., 2012). Such implementation delay 
introduces unplanned variations into the organization of interdependent routines. To the extent to 
which decision makers are bounded in figuring out desirable changes for the long run, there is room 
for such unplanned variations to become a source of rewarding exploration in organizational search. 
Consequently, routines not only foster organizational reliability and facilitate organizational change; 
they also facilitate organizational change through the interaction of routine-level inertia and bounded 
rationality in planning changes. Our theory therefore provides a nuanced angle that adds to our 
understanding of the competitive advantage of reliable organizations characterized by formal routines 
– they lead not just to low variance in performance (conferring an advantage in selection processes) 
but also to increasing average performance (conferring an advantage in organizational adaptation). 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss extant theories on routines and 
their impact on organizational change. In the following section we develop a formal model of 
organizational search to examine how the process and consequences of organizational adaptation are 
influenced by organizational routines, as identified in prior research. In the subsequent simulation 
section, we investigate the consequences of routines for organizational adaptation and (dis)advantage 
in the process of environmental selection which works on a population of organizations. The last 
section provides discussions on the theoretical implications of our results and opportunities for future 
research.  
THEORY 
Routines as a Source of Organizational Reliability and Inertia 
The traditional view of organizational routines portrays them as a source of reliability and inertia. 
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Organizational routines are seen as stable over time, exposing low variance between one iteration and 
the next (Birnholtz, Cohen, & Hoch, 2006; Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Cohen, 2007; Pentland, Hærem, 
& Derek Hillison, 2010; Pentland, 2003). To the extent to which selection forces and processes favor 
low variance in performance, organizational reliability provides survival advantages (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Levinthal & Posen, 2007; Singh, House, & Tucker, 1986). This advantage, however, 
comes at the cost of organizational inertia. This is because high reproducibility, by nature, implies 
resistance or robustness to change pressures (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Resistance against changing 
behavior even in the face of negative performance feedback is indeed a strong empirical regularity in 
human behavior more generally (e.g., Marteau et al., 2012).  
Routines as a Source of Organizational Change  
The view of routines as sources of reliability and inertia is, however, contrasted by a more 
nuanced view that also portrays organizational routines as sources of change. This alternative view 
has identified several mechanisms by which routines can lead to organizational change.  
Recombination of Routines. Routines can be sources of change through recombination – routines 
are ways of accomplishing tasks with high reliability, and they can be recombined in response to 
environmental conditions (e.g., Amburgey et al., 1993; Becker, Knudsen, & March, 2006; Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter & Szulanski, 2001). There are many different potential 
combinations of reliable routines, thus providing a potential explanation of how routines can enhance 
organizational flexibility in adapting to changed circumstances while maintaining reliability. Bigley & 
Roberts (2001), for instance, find that fire brigades allowed constrained improvisation. In this way, 
recombination led to change while maintaining some stable direction (see also Kyriakopoulos & 
Ruyter, 2004). The idea of stable building blocks that provide flexibility through recombination also 
features prominently in the literature on improvisation, which generally points to recombination as a 
powerful source of variation (Moorman & Miner, 1998).  
Routinizing change tasks. While organizational routines are usually associated with exploitation 
tasks, some scholars have pointed out that tasks which are routinized can also comprise exploration or 
change tasks. Nelson & Winter (1982: 134) already argued that ‘organizations have well-defined 
routines for the support and direction of their innovative efforts’ and discussed ‘routine-changing 
processes’ that are themselves ‘routine-guided’ (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 18). Routines can, 
accordingly, generate change when change tasks are accomplished in a systematic, reliable fashion. 
Adler et al. (1999) provide empirical support for this idea in their investigation of the causes of the 
exceptional flexibility/efficiency combination achieved by NUMMI, a car manufacturing joint venture 
of GM and Toyota. They identify ‘meta-routines’ (routines for changing other routines) that facilitated 
the efficient performance of non-routine tasks. Similarly, investigating the mechanisms underlying the 
success of IDEO, a product design firm in California, Hargadon & Sutton (1997) identify some 
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internal routines for systematic exploration, such as specific routines for carrying out brainstorming 
meetings. Whenever IDEO staff get together to start a new innovation project, they follow the same 
brainstorming routine – an important contribution to IDEO’s innovation success, according to 
Hargadon & Sutton (1997). Extending these empirical findings, one might consider any routinized 
approach to product development, such as going through the series of decisions according to stage-
gate models (Cooper & Kleinschmidt, 1986) to support stable processes that generate variance in the 
portfolio of new products.  
Structural Partitioning. Organizations can partition their resources for exploitation routines (that 
reduce variation, e.g. in manufacturing) and exploration routines (that generate variation, e.g. of new 
product designs). In this way, organizational structure and job design are levers for influencing the 
degree to which organizational routines facilitate reliability vs. organizational change. In prior 
research, three different mechanisms have been identified. Tushman & O’Reilly's (1996) idea of 
structural ambidexterity involves having separate organization units dedicated to and specialized in 
exploration and in exploitation. In contrast to ‘contextual ambidexterity’ (Birkinshaw & Gibson, 
2004), structural ambidexterity refers to individuals who are specialized in either exploration or 
exploitation. Adler et al. (1999) found that NUMMI also relied on this mechanism which enabled 
differentiated subunits to work in parallel on routine and nonroutine tasks. 
The structural partitioning mechanism can improve performance by capitalizing on 
complementarities among tasks. For instance, consider job enrichment. Job roles are bundles of tasks 
which can be accomplished by routines (Miner, 1991). Complementary exploration and exploitation 
tasks can be combined in the same job role. In their study of the NUMMI automotive manufacturing 
joint venture, Adler et al. (1999) identified an example of such job role design. Job roles of production 
floor staff contained not just production tasks but also the task of reflecting about and passing on 
improvement possibilities. As Adler et al. (1999) argue, such job enrichment was one cause of 
NUMMI’s exceptional combination of flexibility and efficiency.  
Another way of harnessing complementarity is job role switching. Rather than combining 
different types of tasks within one job role, switching between complementary exploration and 
exploitation roles is a different way to pursue both exploration and exploitation. Such switching can 
be organized systematically at the organization level to make the process reliable. Adler et al. (1999) 
find such a mechanism in NUMMI, where workers switched between production and improvement 
tasks (e.g., Quality Circle meetings, or pilot production runs where workers helped identify problems 
and improvement opportunities). Adler et al. (1999: 51) specifically point out that ‘a broad range of 
policies encouraged workers to switch easily between production and improvement tasks’, 
underlining that such switching was anchored at the organization level. In their study of how routine-
based organizations for emergency response can react flexibly, Bigley & Roberts (2001) also identify 
role switching as one of the mechanisms that enabled such flexibility as well as reliability. In their 
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study of a fire department, they find that role switching, i.e., the reassignment of personnel to different 
positions within the organization, played an important role in this respect. As roles convey well-
defined expectations and define reporting relationships, transferring individuals among 
(complementary or related) roles represents a fairly efficient way of reorienting them to evolving 
conditions (Bigley & Roberts, 2001: 1287). Role switching is thus considered an important element of 
the capability of bureaucratic organizations to react flexibly and reliably to complex, volatile task 
environments. Birkinshaw & Gibson’s (2004) ‘contextual ambidexterity’ also refers to switching 
between exploration and exploitation over time. As the term implies, the organizational context (e.g., 
performance evaluation systems) plays the central role in ensuring the switch.  
Variations within routines. Feldman (2000) and Feldman & Pentland (2003) point out that a 
routine itself can also be an important source of variation. Highlighting the agents that carry out 
routines, they argue that routines are ‘effortful accomplishments’, rather than the result of automatic 
repetition. They point out that agents might adapt the routine in reaction to performance feedback. For 
instance, agents might repair a routine to produce the intended outcome, expand it to make use of new 
possibilities, or strive and attempt to attain something that is difficult to attain (Feldman, 2000: 620). 
In her study of four routines of a university housing organization, Feldman (2000) found that agents 
who carried out the routines for moving students into and out of university dormitories at the turn of 
the academic year changed the routines in order to improve them (e.g., to teach students to take 
responsibility for their rooms rather than just collect payment for damages to dormitory rooms), or to 
cater to specificities of the situation (such as coordinating the move-in with a mass event). Pentland et 
al. (2011) analyze a longitudinal data set of an invoice-processing routine in four organizations. They 
find support for the hypothesis that ‘[i]n the absence of outside intervention, organizational routines 
generate patterns of action that are stable over time’. The invoice-processing routine in these four 
organizations thus drifted over the course of the period considered, indicating that routines can change 
when external conditions stay the same.  
Bounded Rationality and Organizational Adaptation 
The previous subsection provides a comprehensive list of the mechanisms by which routines 
facilitate organizational change. These mechanisms, however, need to account for the fact that agents 
have limited cognitive resources (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Simon, 1947). To make desirable changes 
on the basis of routines, for example, organizations should figure out how to routinize what kinds of 
innovation processes and to what extent; how to structure and balance the exploration and exploitation 
units; when to switch between exploration and exploitation tasks; and which exploration and 
exploitation tasks to bundle in a job role. Further, pursuing both exploration and exploitation at the 
same time through structural partitioning may cause some efficiency losses in either exploration or 
exploitation tasks. In sum, regardless of how systematic they are, efforts to figure out desirable 
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changes in the long run and to assign organizational resources to implement them are subject to 
important limitations as long as human agents are involved (Gavetti, 2012; Levinthal, 2011; Winter, 
2012). 
In this study, we consider the ways in which organizational routines impact organizational 
adaptation. We suggest an alternative mechanism by which the inertial nature of routines contributes 
to organizational adaptation. We show under which conditions this mechanism helps, rather than 
hinders, organizational adaptation. The mechanism highlights a complementarity between routines 
and bounded rationality. Prior research has already identified some other complementarities – e.g., 
routines free cognitive resources which could be used for more valuable purposes (e.g., Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Yet the suggested mechanism has 
not received much attention in the literature, even though both of its elements, bounds to cognitive 
resources and the inertial tendency of routines, are strong empirical regularities. In the next section, 
we develop a formal model of organizational adaptation to demonstrate and investigate the suggested 
mechanism, by paying attention to the duality of routines – that is, routines are capable of not only 
reducing variance of performance but also generating variations in performance (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003; Feldman, 2000).  
MODEL 
Our model is designed to formalize the dual properties of routines and examine their effects on 
organizational adaptation. We extend the NK model which has been widely used to study the process 
of organizational adaptation and environmental selection in a formal way (e.g., Ethiraj & Levinthal, 
2004a; Levinthal & Posen, 2007; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). 
Along with the discussions in the previous section, the model builds on three important empirical 
regularities: (1) organizational adaptation is local, path-dependent and myopic (Levinthal & March, 
1993; Levinthal, 1997; Levitt & March, 1988), (2) organizational routines vary but resist change 
(Becker, 2004; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and thus (3) changes planned 
by decision makers may not take place promptly, which loosens the coupling between high-level 
choices and low-level changes (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2009).  
The Organization and Its Performance 
An organization is represented as a structured set or configuration of N routines, xi (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1984; Levinthal, 1997; Nelson & Winter, 1982), each of which has a state of either 0 or 1.1
                                                     
1 This is a simplest possible setting to model routines which vary between different states. As an extension, one 
might think of more-than-two states of a routine. The model, however, is general enough in the sense that a 
bunch of x variables could be interpreted as subroutines that constitute a routine of more-than-two states. For 
instance, an organization of ten routines with two distinct states could be viewed as an organization of five 
routines with four distinct states. The contribution of a routine is the sum of the contribution of its subroutines, 
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Thus, for a given organization size, N, the number of distinct forms corresponding to the 
configurations of routines amounts to 2N.  
Our performance landscape is based on the classic NK landscape (Kauffman, 1993) in the way 
that we model complexity and performance. When K=0, each of the N routines functions 
independently of each other and there are no constraints that decision makers face in pursuing the best 
configuration of routines. Organizational performance is simply an additive function of the 
contribution of the individual routines. When K>0, the problem of organizational adaptation becomes 
more complex. Complexity increases with K because the contribution of each routine depends on K 
other routines. Thus, each routine may be independent, dependent on other routines, or influence other 
routines; it is possible that a routine may both affect and be affected by other routines. 
Each routine makes a distinct contribution to overall organization performance, albeit one that 
depends on K other routines which are randomly assigned to the focal routine. A routine’s contribution 
value is preset for each configuration of its interdependent routines and itself. This value is drawn 
from a uniform distribution U[0,1]. Organization performance is an average of the contribution values 
of the N organizational routines.  
Organizational Adaptation 
To enhance performance, the organization engages in search for a better configuration of its 
routines. We focus our modeling efforts on two important aspects of organizational adaptation: 
bounded rationality and resistance to change. 
Bounded rationality. Decision makers are boundedly rational and the organization’s planning of 
changes is characterized by an ongoing process of identifying and implementing local, incremental 
changes (Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 1988; Simon, 1947). In our model, change in a 
routine may be planned in each time period: The focal routine is randomly chosen and a change of its 
current state is planned if the expectation is that such a change will improve organizational 
performance (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004a; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Rivkin, 2000). 
Resistance to change. What an organization has learned is stored and exploited in the form of 
routines, and organizational routines enable the organization to keep doing well what it has done 
successfully before (Levitt & March, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Such a function of routines, 
however, not only enhances reliability of performance but also engenders inertia in the process of 
organizational adaptation (Becker, 2004; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Hannan & Freeman, 1984; 
Levinthal, 1991). We explicitly model both consequences of routines. 
First, we model the consequence of routines as a source of inertia in a simplest possible way: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and the interdependence structure remains unchanged indicating which state of which routines influence 
(increases or decreases) the contribution value of which routines. Organizational adaptation still aims to search 
for a better configuration of interdependent routines with the level of complexity held constant in terms of both 
the number of choices (states of routines) and interdependence among them. 
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When change in a routine is planned, the change takes place in one time period with a probability of 1 
- R (0≤R≤1). The parameter R therefore denotes the degree of the routine’s ‘resistance’ to change. 
When R=0, a change planned is promptly implemented and we can see its effect in the next period – 
this is the case of the canonical local search model (e.g., Levinthal, 1997). As R increases, however, it 
takes on average longer time for a planned change to actually be implemented and thus, for its actual 
effect to become observable.  
Second, the consequence of routines as a source of reliability is modeled as follows. In each time 
period, routines face perturbation or variation from within with a rate of P (0≤P≤1). These routine-
level changes could be a result of efforts by agents involved, or of errors (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; 
Feldman, 2000). The probability of actual change, however, is reduced by the degree of resistance to 
change, R. Further, its consequence may or may not be beneficial at the organization level, mainly due 
to organizational complexity and bounded rationality of (routine-level) decision makers. Technically, 
in each period, a routine is assigned a random draw from the uniform distribution, and if its value is 
smaller than P(1-R), the routine is set to be either 0 or 1 with equal probability.  
In sum, resistance to change generated by routines enhances robustness to internal perturbations 
or potentially disruptive changes from within (reliability effect) but slows down execution of change 
plans (inertia effect). This simple but generalizable setup allows us to examine the dynamic process 
and consequence of organizational change driven both by variations within individual routines and by 
decision makers at the organization level. 
SIMULATION 
Using the model, in this section we examine how routines affect organizational adaptation, as 
well as the process and consequences of environmental selection on a population of adapting 
organizations. 
Experiment 1: Routines and Organizational Adaptation 
This experiment is designed to examine how routine-level inertia, combined with boundedly 
rational planning, affects the process and performance of organizational adaptation. In a simulation 
run, 100 organizations with random initial configurations engage in local search for a better 
configuration of routines. The results are measured after 1,000 time periods, enough for their average 
performance to reach a steady state. They are averaged over 100 runs on different landscapes (with 
different seeds for random number generation). Thus, the results for each set of parameter values are 
calculated based on 10,000 observations. 
Figure 1 shows the steady-state performance of organizational adaptation for different degrees of 
resistance to change (R) and internal perturbation (P) at the routine level. The result suggests two 
important patterns. First, some degree of internal perturbation could be beneficial, but its overall 
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effect is detrimental. The intuition behind the mechanism is as follows. In complex environments, 
changes that are detrimental in the short-run may help get out of status quo traps caused by bounded 
rationality in search and therefore enhance long-run performance. This result and the underlying 
mechanism are consistent with that of previous studies on the beneficial role of errors or unintended 
variations in adaptation – e.g., ignorance of cross-divisional interdependences (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 
2005), incomplete architectural knowledge (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004b), or evaluation errors 
(Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). Above a certain level, however, internal perturbations largely hurt 
organizational performance because they counteract coordinated adaptation efforts at the organization 
level. 
===== Insert Figure 1 about here ===== 
Secondly, and more importantly, resistance to change at the routine level not only reduces the 
damage caused by internal perturbations but also further improves the performance of organizational 
adaptation. Routines store what has been learned in the search process and enable the organization to 
replicate what has been done successfully. In this regard, resistance to change provides robustness 
against internal perturbation, which hinders such continuity (reliability effect). However, this is not 
the only consequence of routines. Resistance to change at the routine level delays implementation of 
planned changes (inertia effect), which introduces unplanned variations into the organization of 
interdependent routines – i.e., variations in the completion, timing and sequence of the 
implementation of planned changes. To the extent to which organizations are bounded in figuring out 
and planning desirable changes, there is room for such unplanned variations to become a source of 
rewarding exploration in organizational search (exploration effect). Subsequent planning builds on the 
mixed consequence of previously planned changes and unplanned variations. The result of superior 
performance implies that useful variations have been systematically retained in the process of 
organizational change. Consequently, routines not only foster organizational reliability but also 
facilitate organizational change. 
This result supports and adds to the conventional idea that the degree of inertia tends to increase 
in a population of complex organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Our result implies that 
organizations characterized by more reliable routines have an advantage in selection processes not 
only because of the reliability of their performance (i.e., reduced variance of performance) but also 
because of the potential of rewarding exploration (i.e., enhanced average of performance). It is 
therefore expected that the degree of reliability or inertia, measured by average R in a population of 
organizations, will increase over time in the process of organizational adaptation and environmental 
selection. In the next subsection, we further investigate this process and develop useful insights. 
Experiment 2: Environmental Selection and Emergence of Inertia 
To examine the competitive (dis)advantage of more or less reliable organizations in selection 
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processes, we design a new simulation experiment with a population of organizations that engage in 
local search under a risk of failure or environmental selection. The organizations are heterogeneous in 
the degree of inertia (R), and the probability of failure is determined by their relative performance. 
Therefore, how long an organization survives will depend on how well it manages to adapt while 
maintaining good enough performance over time so as to survive selection and continue search.  
The adaptation of an organizational population or industry evolution is often characterized by a 
few stylized patterns: entries of heterogeneous organizations, their gradual adaptation and sequential 
exits of laggards (Klepper & Graddy, 1990). Since the aim of our analysis is to understand the 
influence of routines on organizational adaptation and survival, we focus on the process of industry 
shakeout or organizational failures. In doing so, other processes such as entrepreneurial development 
and market entry of new organizations are not explicitly formalized. The specific setting of the new 
simulation experiment is as follows. A simulation run starts with a population of 100 organizations 
with random configurations of routines – i.e. the states of the N routines to be either 0 or 1 with equal 
probabilities. The organizations engage in local search as specified in the model above and face a 
continuous risk of failure.  
The selection process draws on the ideas of genetic load and myopic selection. The former means 
that the selection pressure on a population of organizations increases with the gap between the 
average fitness and the best fitness in the population, and the probability of a particular organization’s 
failure is determined by its relative fitness as compared to that of the most fit organization (Levinthal, 
1997; Wilson & Bossert, 1971). This idea is formalized as follows. At the end of each time period 
(after organizational adaptation), an organization is randomly chosen and selected out with a 
probability equal to the ratio of its performance to that of the best performer at that time. The size of 
the population, therefore, may or may not decrease during a time period, and the probability that it 
loses an organization increases as the market leader dominates the average ones to a larger extent. 
This selection process is myopic in the sense that an organization’s potential of success in the future is 
not taken into account (Levinthal & Posen, 2007). Therefore, an organization is subject to the tradeoff 
between the potential of beneficial change and the reliability (or continuity) of performance. That is, it 
should survive in the short run to get chances for the long-run. 
Figure 2 shows the performance of survived organizations and the level of inertia in the 
organizational population. It confirms the expectation that the level of organizational performance and 
inertia would increase in the process of environmental selection. This population-level phenomenon is 
largely consistent with extant theories (e.g., Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Our theory on routines, 
however, provides a nuanced explanation of the phenomenon by highlighting the exploration-
generating role of routine-level inertia in the process of organizational change which is constrained by 
decision makers’ bounded rationality. Routines not only help maintain reliability to earn time for 
survival and further adaptation (advantage in selection) but also help overcome the status-quo bias by 
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engendering rewarding variations in the implementation process of planned changes (advantage in 
adaptation). Those advantages in both adaptation and selection are mutually reinforcing and thus may 
help overcome the disadvantage of organizational inertia in adaptation. The mechanism of routine-
engendered exploration is different from other routine-related mechanisms well documented in 
previous studies, and its complementarity with other mechanisms such as myopia of learning and 
selection has been underexplored in the literature on routines and organizational change. 
===== Insert Figure 2 about here ===== 
The inertial nature of routines is not only relevant for organizational reliability but also for the 
long-run performance of organizational change. Therefore, organizations characterized more strongly 
by routines, as opposed to those characterized less by routines (e.g., more ad-hoc or younger 
organization), have an advantage in the evolutionary process driven by myopic selection forces. This 
helps better understand the emergence and persistence of routines, and thus inertia, in organizational 
populations. From this nuanced perspective, the evolutionary reason of inertia therefore includes its 
adaptive role in the process of organizational change. Resistance to change engenders unplanned 
variations in the timing and sequence of the implementation of planned changes, which helps 
overcome the status-quo bias in adaptation and attain a better configuration of interdependent routines.  
DISCUSSION 
Routines and Organizational Reliability 
In this study, we suggest a novel mechanism by which the stability of routines, as a primary 
source of reliability and inertia, helps organizational adaptation in complex task environments by 
engendering the potential of exploration held by the interaction of the stability-inducing feature of 
organizational routines with the bounded rationality of decision makers. Our theory adds to the long-
lasting discussions on how routines help or hinder organizational adaptation, which lie at the 
intersection of the literatures on routines, organizational change, and economic evolution.  
This question is important for two primary reasons. First, the nature and role of routines lie at the 
heart of the theory of economic evolution. In the evolutionary process, selection forces shape the 
population of survived organizations to better fit the environment. In this logic, the fact that 
organizations cannot adapt perfectly to the environment gives rise to the importance of selection as a 
powerful force of change. Organizations, however, do adapt by change efforts of organizational 
members. A more nuanced perspective therefore suggests that adaptation and selection are not 
mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather fundamentally interdependent processes that drive the 
evolutionary process (Levinthal, 1991). To the extent to which routines are involved in both 
organizational adaptation and environmental selection, the question of how routines influence 
organizational adaptation becomes important in understanding of the evolutionary process of 
economic changes jointly driven by selection and adaptation. 
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Second, this helps enhance our understanding of why reliability, despite the issue of inertia, 
could be a strongly favored trait of organizations in the evolutionary process. The fundamental 
challenge that a changing organization faces is to find and introduce desirable changes, given the risk 
of change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984; Hannan, Pólos, & Carroll, 2003). Theory, however, suggests 
that organizations by nature are bounded in their capabilities of foreseeing desirable changes and 
implementing intended ones (Gavetti, 2012; Levinthal, 2011; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Simon, 1955). 
Further, by the same reasons, organizational learning and adaptation are self-limiting, often causing 
false learning and status-quo bias (e.g., Denrell & March, 2001; Levinthal & March, 1993; Levinthal, 
1997). A key to sustainable success is therefore how to maintain the potential of rewarding 
exploration while operating on the reliable basis of previous solutions to survive the risky process of 
change. The possibility that routines, as a primary source of reliability, also help organizational 
change is therefore an important key to understanding the performance of high-reliability 
organizations that look inertial but keep surviving and often outperforming (Adler & Borys, 1996; 
Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Levinthal & Posen, 2007; Weick & Roberts, 1993).  
Routines and the Theory of Economic Evolution 
The suggested theory contributes to the internal consistency of the evolutionary theory which 
draws on the stability of routines as an analogue of genes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). If the concept of 
routines is essential in developing the theory of economic evolution, the emergence and persistence of 
(the stability or inertia of) routines should also be explained in an evolution-friendly way. That is, 
routines should provide organizations with an evolutionary advantage in the process of their 
adaptation or environmental selection. By highlighting the bounded rationality of decision makers and 
the adaptive role of routines, our theory explains this in terms of both adaptation and selection. That is, 
the stability or inertia of routines not only enhances the reliability of organizational performance but 
also (unintendedly) helps organizational adaptation in task environments characterized by complexity. 
From this perspective, organizations have incentives and tendencies to develop in the direction in 
which their activities are routinized. This direction of organizational change in turn helps selection 
forces and thus the mechanism of evolution to work well, benefiting the population as a whole. 
Therefore, the mechanism of evolution could be, by using the evolutionary term, ‘selected’ as the 
primary force which drives changes in surviving populations.  
Future Research 
Our theory raises promising opportunities for future research. First, the conditions where 
reliability has more or less advantages can be further examined. Considerable factors will include, for 
example, the nature of industry structure and competition, the degree of environmental turbulence, 
and the effects of entry or entrepreneurship. For each of them, we need to make assumptions for 
formalization which should be grounded on supporting theories. We hope our model and related 
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theories serve as a useful basis. Further, our results will provide useful insights to understand their 
processes and consequences. For instance, Figure 2 shows that average R temporarily declines in early 
periods, which implies that frequent environmental changes would undermine the proposed 
mechanism and thus the advantage of reliable organizations (Levinthal & Posen, 2007). Nevertheless, 
other mechanisms such as organizational slacks, integration of decision-making structure, and 
recycling of abandoned solutions or technologies may take place and help overcome unexpected 
shocks. This will bring reliable organizations back on track and allow them to benefit from the 
advantage of reliability. 
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Figure 1. Effects of Routines on Organizational Adaptation 
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Figure 2. Environmental Selection and the Emergence of Inertia 
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